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WARLORDS AND MOOTW: U.S. COMMANDERS MUST  
APPLY OPERATIONAL FACTORS AND THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

by


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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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16 May 2000

  
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As we enter the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, it is quite likely that we will be called upon to conduct MOOTW in many other areas of the globe unknown to most Americans. To preclude a repeat of the October 1993 tragedy in which eighteen military personnel were killed in Somalia, US commanders must utilize operational art. Specifically, operational commanders must utilize the operational factors of time, force and space. Additionally, these commanders should apply the principles of war and reject MOOTW doctrine that constrains the effectiveness of US forces against warlords.

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## Introduction

*300 UN troops taken hostage by rebel forces in Sierra Leone  
UN requests United States to transport additional foreign peacekeepers  
White House states absolutely no consideration given to sending US soldiers to the area*

[May 4, 2000] Rebels have taken more than 300 United Nations troops hostage in Sierra Leone.... The 8300 member UN force, composed mainly of African and Indian troops, was rapidly losing confidence under the assault.... The entire mission, meant to secure the peace after eight years of civil war, was in jeopardy.... Foday Sankoh and his rebel forces have terrorized the country with a campaign of chopping off hands, feet and arms.... Sankoh's troops - assumed by the administration to number about 6,000, with many of them unemployed teenagers - chose a window of opportunity just after Nigerian troops had withdrawn from Sierra Leone and before the UN force was up to full strength.... The administration...is considering a request from the United Nations to provide transport planes to ferry some of the 3,000 Jordanian, Bangladeshi and Indian troops still scheduled to go to Sierra Leone.... There was absolutely no consideration of sending U.S. soldiers, officials said. In similar situations in the past, though, the use of U.S. transport planes has required U.S. troops to help secure the airport to ensure that the aircraft and military personnel involved do not come under attack.<sup>1</sup>

The above incident has implications for the United States. An examination of the operational art to be employed by U.S. commanders in confronting warlords seems appropriate. Will Sierra Leone and warlord Foday Sankoh become the newest dilemma and demon on the block for the United States and its military? Perhaps a U.S. operational commander will be tasked to assume a portion of the UN peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone. If so, one of his more difficult tasks will be determining the most effective method for handling Foday Sankoh, particularly if the media begins to focus on the atrocities committed by Sankoh and his troops. If so, he may become as notorious as certain warlords from the recent past, i.e., Noriega, Hussein, Cedras, Aideed and Milosevic.

Even if this particular crisis is resolved without U.S. intervention, it is certainly likely that the 21<sup>st</sup> century will present many challenges in which our peace operations are made increasingly difficult by warlords. This paper examines the principles we have utilized in the

recent past for such situations and provides recommendations for enhancing our chances for success in future crises involving warlords.

### **Background**

Manuel Noriega, Saddam Hussein, Raoul Cedras, Mohamed Aideed, Slobodan Milosevic. Each fit within Webster's definition of warlord: "a military commander exercising civil power seized or maintained by force, usually purely from self-interest and usually over a limited region with or without recognition of a central government."<sup>2</sup> Each of these warlords created significant problems for the United States and its military, particularly with respect to our MOOTW (Military Operations Other Than War) missions in the respective regions controlled by these warlords.<sup>3</sup>

Although none of the MOOTW missions were identical, utilization of certain components of operational art would have enhanced our likelihood of success. Specifically, application of the operational factors and principles of war would have enabled the United States to better overcome and remove the warlord obstacles.

Typically, operational commanders have adhered to the three MOOTW principles not contained in the principles of war: restraint, perseverance and legitimacy.<sup>4</sup> Further, unclear political objectives have hindered commanders from developing an appropriate military objective, the most important principle in MOOTW and war.<sup>5</sup> Additionally, the principles of unity of effort and security (common to both MOOTW and warfare) may conflict, particularly in unusual humanitarian coalitions. As outlined in greater detail below, the MOOTW principles and doctrine have often constrained operational commanders in taking effective action against warlords.

Simply stated, the warlord threat does not fit neatly in the established MOOTW doctrine. Operational commanders need to revise or even reject certain MOOTW principles and instead apply certain components of operational art in dealing with the problem.

### **Operational Art**

Operational art has been defined as “a component of military art concerned with the theory and practice of planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining major operations and campaigns aimed at accomplishing operational or strategic objectives in a given theater.”<sup>6</sup> Components of operational art include “operational factors, methods of combat force employment, elements and principles of operational warfare, operational functions, operational planning and operational leadership.”<sup>7</sup> Milan Vego has noted “Sound application of operational art is the key to winning decisively in the shortest time and with the least loss.”<sup>8</sup> Operational commanders tasked with MOOTW missions in regions controlled by warlords will enhance their likelihood of prompt success by utilizing operational art, particularly certain principles of war and operational factors.

The U.S. operational commanders responsible for such missions should also address the four basic operational art questions<sup>9</sup> that U.S. commanders routinely consider for warfare:

1. What military conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal?
2. What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition?
3. How should the resources of the force be applied to accomplish the desired sequence of actions?
4. What is the likely cost or risk in performing that sequence of actions?

The commander must decide whether the warlord’s removal is an appropriate strategic goal, a necessary condition for a different strategic goal, too risky or even inconsequential to the MOOTW mission. The commander’s conclusion obviously will impact the quantity and quality of attention given by our forces to the warlord. Accordingly,

just as in warfare, it is critical for the operational staff to develop a thorough METT-T<sup>10</sup> (mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time) analysis which will assist the commander in making his decision as to the attention and resources to be devoted to the warlord.

Additionally, the METT-T analysis will enable the commander to answer the four critical operational art questions.

While recognizing every situation will be different, operational commanders should bolster their chance of success by identifying the warlord's removal as a strategic goal or at least as a necessary condition. Further, rapid removal of the warlord should accelerate the commander's ability to achieve the primary MOOTW mission and minimize the potential harm to MOOTW that can be done by the warlord's forces. After Noriega and Cedras were removed from power, the United States was able to proceed in accomplishing its MOOTW missions in Panama and Haiti. By contrast, we are still having great difficulties conducting MOOTW in areas subject to control by Hussein and Milosevic, perhaps in part because we did not establish the removal of Hussein or Milosevic as strategic goals and did not properly answer the operational art questions.

As the warlord will often not be considered a legitimate head of state and may even be a war criminal, U.S. forces should not unnecessarily restrict themselves in contemplating various removal methods. The U.S. has used several different methods to attempt to remove warlords or reduce their base of power. Known methods have included negotiations (Cedras and Noriega), bribery (Cedras), capture (Noriega and Aideed), display of massive force (Cedras) and use of force against the warlord's forces (Noriega, Aideed, Hussein and Milosevic). The operational commander and his staff should identify and consider multiple methods, up to and including specific targeting of the warlord, to remove the warlord from

power. Evaluation of each method should include specific consideration of the operational factors of time, space and force.<sup>11</sup>

### **Operational Factors**

Time, space and force should be scrutinized as closely in MOOTW as in war. However, it may even be more difficult in MOOTW than in war to determine the proper balance of these factors. With respect to warfare, we may have previously conducted similar exercises or can examine historical examples of force ratios and logistics support to provide some basis for calculating the necessary time, space and force. For MOOTW, operational commanders are often provided with imprecise political aims and have done very limited, if any, planning for accomplishing the specific MOOTW mission. Additionally, political issues often affect all aspects of the mission.<sup>12</sup>

At least initially, commanders will often only have cursory intelligence on the warlord and the methods he may use to disrupt MOOTW. The United States may have rather limited information on the local region, its people and the culture. Further, very few military personnel will have any detailed knowledge of the area, thus impeding the ability to develop sound plans for conducting the MOOTW and the warlord's removal.

In addition to the lack of data for the best application of operational factors, the MOOTW principles of restraint, perseverance and legitimacy often run counter to time, space and force considerations. Rather than expedite our actions and ensure we have a sufficiently large force, we often delay and use minimum, even inadequate forces, due to our vast array of worldwide commitments. However, MOOTW operations taking place in areas controlled by warlords should be conducted differently. These MOOTW missions should emphasize time, space and force that will enable us to quickly remove the warlord from power. Once

this step has been taken, we can more efficiently accomplish the remaining MOOTW objectives.

We have not typically pursued swift or unrestrained removal efforts, primarily due to political considerations and legitimacy concerns. Instead, we normally allow months, if not years, before exerting considerable political or military effort to remove the warlord. By the time the United States ended the three year reign of the Cedras junta in Haiti, "An estimated 4,000 people were killed, around 300,000 became internal refugees, thousands more fled across the border to the Dominican Republic, and more than 60,000 took to the high seas to seek asylum in the United States."<sup>13</sup>

Operation *Just Cause* does reflect one example in which we moved with great alacrity once the decision was finally made to remove Noriega and the Panamanian Defense Force from power. In fact, *Just Cause* has been described as a masterpiece of operational art, a mission in which the operational commander translated confusing strategic goals into lucid military objectives.<sup>14</sup> Within eight hours, the U.S. forces took over Panama, squashed Noriega's military forces and established such control that Noriega had little choice but to surrender within a period of days.

Operation *Just Cause* illustrated the speed in which success can be achieved with timely and effective coordination of our various military capabilities. Some might construe the display of overwhelming force and rapid action as contrary to the MOOTW principles of restraint and perseverance. However, warlords typically are not interested in developing a harmonious relationship with our forces or in facilitating peace operations. Accordingly, unless the METT-T analysis and the answers to the operational art questions dictate otherwise, operational commanders should always at least consider a very rapid and

overwhelming force option to remove a warlord from power. We have achieved our greatest success when we deployed an overwhelming force in *Just Cause* and in Operation *Uphold Democracy* in Haiti.

Somalia is an example of MOOTW in which the United States lost sight of the operational factors, at least in large part due to the changing objectives. The MOOTW mission was divided into three stages - *Provide Relief, Restore Hope* and UNOSOM II.<sup>15</sup>

Initially...over 25,000 well-equipped and well-trained U.S. troops, together with 13,000 troops from over 20 other nations were in Somalia to assist in feeding thousands of starving Somalis. The world applauded this expression of compassion. There were guidelines in the operations order as to how to deal with threats from hostile, armed Somalis, and when and where to seize arms.<sup>16</sup>

Subsequent political considerations and transition to UN command of the operations greatly expanded the goals to include “forcibly disarming the warring factions; political reconciliation; and nation-building.”<sup>17</sup> Simultaneously, the Administration directed U.S. military leaders to reduce the U.S. military presence in Somalia. By October 3, 1993, the day on which eighteen U.S. military personnel were killed in the Mogadishu tragedy, U.S. forces had been reduced to approximately 4000, of which only 2000 were combat-trained troops.<sup>18</sup>

The United States Senate investigation into the tragic deaths of the American servicemen criticized the inconsistent dual track policy of the administration to reduce the force structure while simultaneously tasking the forces to capture the warlord Mohamed Aideed.<sup>19</sup> Stated simply, the operational factors of time, space and force favored the Somalis as time increased and U.S. troops had to cover more ground and increasingly complex targets with fewer forces.

Additionally, our problems were exacerbated by losing the capability of surprise, at least in part due to utilization of the MOOTW principles of restraint, perseverance and

legitimacy. The United States political leadership was very concerned about collateral damage and its image to the world. In addition to our reduced force size, our rules of engagement became more constrained. American forces were ordered to give fifteen, ten and five minute warnings before attacking targets.<sup>20</sup> In hindsight, it appears U.S. political leadership became more concerned with collateral damage and the deaths of Somali citizens than with minimizing the harm to and unnecessary deaths of American service members.

#### **Operational Commanders Must Reject Or Modify Certain MOOTW Principles**

During the past few years, the Department of Defense has developed several publications governing MOOTW doctrine, recognizing that military forces will increasingly be called upon to accomplish such missions. These publications, such as Joint Publication 3-07, Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, consistently identify six principles of MOOTW: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance and legitimacy.<sup>21</sup> While these principles may be sound for the vast majority of the sixteen enumerated MOOTW missions, operational commanders must modify or reject certain principles in confronting warlords.<sup>22</sup>

Specifically, operational commanders need to give serious consideration to rejecting the principles of restraint, perseverance and legitimacy in order to remove warlords from power. Joint Pub 3-07 advises commanders that they must judiciously apply force (restraint), be prepared to wait several years to achieve the desired end-state (perseverance) and refrain from actions which could be viewed as unfair to certain factions (legitimacy).<sup>23</sup> However, stringent application of these principles constrains U.S. forces and subjects them to unnecessary danger from warlords that have mocked international law, violated human decency and showed no restraint to their enemies.

As to other MOOTW principles, unity of effort and security have occasionally contravened each other. In Somalia, the Italian representative to the UN task force conducted his own personal negotiations with Aideed while the rest of the UN force was attempting to capture him.<sup>24</sup> Joint Pub 3-07 cautions that the tenuous relationships between the US and MOOTW coalition partners requires commanders to “be alert to the possibility that covert intelligence operations may be conducted against them by a coalition partner.”<sup>25</sup> This problem is common to warfare as well and will not go away. Operational commanders need to remain cognizant of this dilemma and take those steps that favor security.

As to the remaining principle of objective, MOOTW doctrine cautions operational commanders that the objective may often change. If only peaceful missions were involved, a change in objective is not as important. However, when dealing with warlords, changing objectives can produce the inadequate forces and deadly results of Mogadishu. Accordingly, operational commanders should ensure and demand that political leaders provide specific, measurable objectives. After determining the MOOTW objective, the operational commander will be in a much better position to determine if the warlord should be captured, targeted or left alone in the MOOTW mission.

In addition to sharpening the focus to be given to warlords, mandating a specific objective for the MOOTW mission compels political and military leaders to seriously evaluate the value of the MOOTW mission. Such evaluation should be done before we needlessly lose American lives and end up conducting congressional inquiries to apportion blame.

### Principles Of War Must Be Used Against Warlords

Joint Pub 3-07 suggests that commanders should consider the principles of war in conjunction with the MOOTW principles for certain MOOTW missions.<sup>26</sup> However, this statement and similar comments in other MOOTW publications almost appear to be afterthoughts. The guidance certainly does not explain how to address the inherent inconsistencies in the MOOTW and warfare principles. Operation *Just Cause* and Operation *Uphold Democracy* reflect that operational commanders will achieve greater success against warlords by skillfully utilizing the principles of surprise, mass and offensive and rejecting the MOOTW principles of restraint, perseverance and legitimacy.

The value of surprise is probably best demonstrated by contrasting our efforts in attempting to capture Manuel Noriega and Mohamed Aideed. Although Noriega ultimately turned himself in to U.S. authorities, he had basically no place left to hide other than the refuge he sought in the papal nuncio's residence.<sup>27</sup> Major Todd Megill's monograph on the value of surprise reflects the qualitative differences between the U.S. efforts in targeting and isolating Noriega through more than forty simultaneous raids and the relatively small number of predictable and sequential efforts to capture Aideed.<sup>28</sup> Inadequate intelligence, limited resources and inability to generate surprise made it essentially impossible for the U.S. troops to seize Aideed.<sup>29</sup> Major Megill asserts "Task Force Ranger did not try to deceive Aideed about any aspect of the raid."<sup>30</sup> Instead, our actions made us vulnerable to attack and led to the horrible incident in Mogadishu, particularly since we also failed to utilize the principles of mass and offensive.

By contrast, Operation *Just Cause* did utilize the principles of mass and offensive. U.S. forces brought overwhelming forces to Panama and were prepared to unleash massive

offensive power against Noriega and the Panamanian Defense Forces. Mass and offensive also helped us attain economy of effort because we were able to force the enemy to quickly capitulate rather than getting into a protracted war of attrition. As Clausewitz stated: “The best strategy is always to be very strong; first in general, and then at the decisive point.”<sup>31</sup>

Given sufficient mass and offensive, we can also attain success even if we lose some element of surprise. The 20,000 United States Marines deployed and poised to assault Haiti convinced Cedras that he should relinquish control. His decision was also made easier by the fact that he was permitted to keep the approximate \$100 million dollars he had stolen from the Haitian people.<sup>32</sup> We should not be too hesitant to consider this type of quid pro quo arrangement with future warlords. After all, MOOTW missions are expensive, particularly when we must send American servicemen in harm’s way to complete the mission. It is far better to reach this conclusion before we lose our men and women in uniform than to pull out as soon as we sustain casualties as we did in Somalia.

The day after the October 3, 1993 Mogadishu tragedy, Senator Robert Byrd (D) “called for an immediate end to these cops-and-robbers operations.”<sup>33</sup> Similarly, Senator John McCain (R) stated “Clinton’s got to bring them home.”<sup>34</sup> The politicians had decided that Somalia was no longer worth the risk of losing any more U.S. lives. This quick withdrawal raises serious consideration as to whether the military and political leaders had ever reached consensus on the objective of the MOOTW mission in Somalia. Closer cooperation and agreement between Congress, the military and various agencies throughout the entire Somali mission may have precluded this tragedy.

### **The MOOTW Objective Must Be Coordinated Among Agencies**

The Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations discusses the role that various agencies have in MOOTW.<sup>35</sup> Each of these agencies should be consulted for its insights on the strengths and weaknesses of the warlord. This information should be considered as the military commander evaluates the best procedures for handling the warlord. If the operational commander's analysis concludes that the warlord should be removed, the political and military leadership must discuss and reach agreement as to the best protocol for pursuing the warlord. This procedure should minimize the possibility of sending mixed messages to the warlord and his supporters. Somalia displayed that we still have significant strides to make with respect to inter-agency coordination.

General Colin Powell informed the Senate investigators that the military "had a hard time getting clear guidance from the inter-agency process. We got messages from Ambassador Gosende, but nothing from State. There were many meetings but no results."<sup>36</sup> By contrast, a Foreign Service expert in Somalia has indicated that he had very good relations in dealing with U.S. military units in Somalia with the notable exception of "headquarters units where there was often a pretense of political expertise and real reluctance to hear outside opinion."<sup>37</sup> Presumably all parties need to improve their coordination skills.

Inter-agency coordination and unity of effort can simultaneously jeopardize security, particularly due to the wide array of agencies and international partners that may possess different views on restraint and legitimacy of certain missions. Certain agencies may believe it necessary and critical to release this information to the media and the public. The leak of certain information, including the potential danger to U.S. troops, may ultimately lead to a weakening in political will to pursue the warlord. The operational commander must be

aware of this possibility and seek to maintain a consistent desired end-state, including the removal of the warlord, unless the leak of the information has made the mission too risky. Interestingly enough, MOOTW doctrine cautions commanders that the desired end-state provided by the political leaders will often not be defined or may be unrealistic.<sup>38</sup>

Operational commanders must also give serious consideration as to the quality and quantity of information provided by the military to the media, including specific pronouncements as to the desirability and necessity of capturing the warlord. Somalia's Aideed was very much aware that American forces were searching for him and appeared to have advance notice of every effort made to capture him.<sup>39</sup> U.S. efforts to capture Aideed were made significantly more difficult by the continued media focus on him and his awareness of the specific protocol the military was using to conduct its raids and capture attempts.

#### Impact Of MOOTW Doctrine

Assuming the operational commander has chosen to utilize the principles of war against warlords, he still must contemplate the impact that MOOTW doctrine may have on other agencies and the media. These organizations are likely to gain access to the joint doctrine publications and may ask pointed questions regarding efforts to remove the warlords. The military commander may be asked to explain why he recommends the utilization of principles of war instead of the stringent application of restraint, perseverance and legitimacy. The operational commander must be able to rationally and calmly explain why certain steps appearing to contravene the MOOTW doctrine are being taken with respect to warlords. This explanation bears up better when United States political leaders provide

sustained support of military efforts to remove the warlord from power and do not change the desired end-state with respect to the warlord.

### **Victory Over Warlords Should Remain Desired End State**

The JTF Commander's Handbook advises operational commanders to seek settlement rather than victory in MOOTW missions.<sup>40</sup> FM 100-23, Peace Operations, identifies the "ultimate measure of success" in peace operations as settlement, not victory.<sup>41</sup> Such guidance may subconsciously affect our actions and even give justified hope to the warlord that the U.S. is not adamant about defeating him and his forces. Additionally, the JTF Commander's Handbook states: "[W]ell intended actions can be especially dangerous in peaceful situations, where they can threaten impartiality as well as undermine long-term programs. In many cases, inaction will be better than action."<sup>42</sup>

Warlords seize and maintain power by force and do it purely from self-interest. With respect to the infamous individuals discussed in this paper, none of them maintained their power by being civil and polite negotiators. They also have not shown any interest in acting in such a fashion that would provide greatest benefit to their fellow citizens. Instead, these individuals have allowed countless citizens to be killed and have plundered their national treasuries. Protracted settlement negotiations have typically encouraged them to be more recalcitrant and simply wait until the United States tires of having troops in that part of the world. Restraint and lengthy deployments overseas are not likely to generate strong support among American citizens, politicians or the military.

Warlords are sufficiently astute to recognize that inflicting casualties to Americans may accelerate U.S. fatigue. Warlords know that casualties will cause the American media and politicians to generate stories and questions as to the value and legitimacy of sending

military personnel to far parts of the globe that are of no vital interest to the United States. The warlord's dilemma is how to generate such news stories and questions without inflicting such damage that America does not feel compelled to respond with overwhelming force.

The operational commander must keep everyone focused on the desired end-state so that casualty aversion does not end up becoming America's consistent Achilles heel. The JTF Commander's Handbook cautions the "media may be of more importance to the military in MOOTW than war.... The media can be an ally and an additional source of information."<sup>43</sup> Few military personnel are likely to doubt the incredible importance of the media. On the other hand, the vast majority of our military members are probably quite wary and hesitant to speak candidly with the media. Operational commanders must take the advice offered in the JTF Handbook and keep the media informed on the warlord's horrible atrocities. Developing this bond with the media should build and maintain support to remove warlords from power.

#### **Operational Commanders Must Evaluate Warlord's Local Support**

America's mixed success with the warlords discussed above appears to correspond directly to the level of local support for the warlord. As noted in the *Uphold Democracy* Joint After Action Report: "In MOOTW the attitude of the population can be the single largest factor in determining the success of the operation."<sup>44</sup> We achieved our greatest success against Noriega and Cedras, two warlords who were less popular and thus more vulnerable to intelligence collection by the US through local nationals in Panama and Haiti.<sup>45</sup> "Noriega's attempts to whip up anti-American feelings among his people failed miserably....Noriega was truly reviled, as Panamanians proved when they helped hunt down the dictator."<sup>46</sup> In Haiti, Cedras apparently recognized that he did not have sufficient popular

support to stay in power and was convinced by his wife that his family's life would be in danger if he continued to resist the United States' request that he leave office.<sup>47</sup>

By contrast, Aideed and Hussein successfully projected themselves as national saviors or at least maintained such tight control that they were far less vulnerable to US intelligence collection. In fact, the UN's decision to target Aideed and subsequent "lack of success in capturing him increased his status in the minds of his supporters."<sup>48</sup> Operational commanders must analyze the issue of local support and determine if US forces will be considered evil pariahs or blessed saviors from the warlord.

### Conclusion

The horrible images of Mogadishu, the tragedy of American military personnel being killed and dragged through streets in a small violent land, cannot be easily forgotten by anyone who saw the spectacle broadcast around the world. We must ensure that we have taken all necessary steps to minimize the future occurrence of similar debacles. Such preparation is particularly important for those regions of the world controlled by warlords, violent and ruthless individuals who will not be interested in American intervention.

The recent past reflects a mixed record of success and failure for the U.S. military with respect to addressing the warlord threat in our MOOTW missions. We have achieved the greatest success when we utilized the principles of war and operational factors to remove the warlord from power. Operation *Just Cause* in Panama and Operation *Uphold Democracy* exemplified the benefits that can be achieved with the use of surprise, mass and offensive and by focusing on time, space and force considerations to overwhelm the warlord and his forces.

By contrast, our peace operations in Somalia displayed a lack of focus, a change in objective and a failure to employ operational art. Instead of utilizing operational factors and

the principles of war, we emphasized the MOOTW principles of restraint, perseverance and legitimacy. The administration's inconsistent dual track policy led to a reduction in U.S. forces from over 25,000 to 4,000 troops and a simultaneous expansion in objectives to include nation-building and the capture of warlord Mohamed Aideed. We also made the mission more difficult by drastically reducing our capability to utilize surprise. Each of these decisions made it increasingly difficult for U.S. troops to be effective and contributed to the Mogadishu disaster.

American political leaders have typically been hesitant to deploy massive numbers of military personnel to overseas locations that are not of vital interest to the United States. However, these same leaders have not been hesitant to send some level of military force to just about every corner of the globe to assist in peace operations. The present international environment includes a vast array of regions involved in civil war and deplorable living conditions, many of which may become locations for future U.S. peace operations. As a result, it is quite likely that U.S. military personnel will increasingly be challenged by warlord threats, all of which will pose unique problems and political considerations.

Operational commanders tasked with future MOOTW missions should examine our successes and failures from the recent past and employ operational art that allows us to accomplish the peacekeeping operations. If warlords endanger our forces or hinder us from accomplishing the MOOTW objective, the operational commander should recommend and employ the operational factors and principles of war that most rapidly and effectively eliminate the warlord threat.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Jane Perlez and Christopher Wren, "300 U.N. troops taken hostage by rebel forces in Sierra Leone," *The Providence Journal*, 6 May 2000, pp. 1:2.

<sup>2</sup> *Webster's Third New International Dictionary*, (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster Inc. Publishers 1981)

<sup>3</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (Joint Pub 3-07) (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 1995), vii.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, II-1.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, II-2.

<sup>6</sup> Milan Vego, "Introduction to Operational Art," Part I: Fundamentals, *On Operational Art*, 1999, 5.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Joint Pub 3-0)(Washington, D.C.: February 1, 1995), II-3.

<sup>10</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Peace Operations* (FM 100-23) (Washington, D.C.: December 1994), 12.

<sup>11</sup> Vego, Part II: Operational Factors, 53.

<sup>12</sup> Joint Warfighting Center, *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook For Peace Operations* (Ft. Monroe, VA: June 16, 1997), I-6.

<sup>13</sup> Alex Dupuy, *Haiti in the New World Order*, (Boulder: Westview 1997), 139.

<sup>14</sup> Thomas Donnelly and others, *Operation Just Cause, The Storming of Panama* (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 398.

<sup>15</sup> Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press 1995), 21.

<sup>16</sup> Congress, Senate, *Review of the Circumstances Surrounding the Ranger Raid*, September 29, 1995, 4.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>20</sup> Allard, 65.

<sup>21</sup> *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, (Joint Pub 3-07), II-2.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., III-1.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., II-4,5.

<sup>24</sup> Allard, 56.

<sup>25</sup> *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, (Joint Pub 3-07), IV-3.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., II-1.

<sup>27</sup> Todd A. Megill, "OOTW, Raids and Tactical Surprise," (Unpublished research paper), 12.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 11,20,36.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 29-30.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 30.

<sup>31</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1989), 204.

<sup>32</sup> Dupuy, 160.

<sup>33</sup> Mark Bowden, *Black Hawk Down*, (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press 1999), 310.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, IV-6,8.

<sup>36</sup> Congress, Senate, *Review of the Circumstances Surrounding the Ranger Raid*, 44.

<sup>37</sup> Gerald W. Scott, "Operations in Somalia: Examples of the Need for Greater Flexibility and Lateral Outreach in Conducting Military/Civilian/Humanitarian Operations," (Unpublished research paper), 9.

<sup>38</sup> *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, I-13.

<sup>39</sup> Megill, 29.

<sup>40</sup> *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, IV-1.

<sup>41</sup> *Peace Operations* (FM 100-23), v.

<sup>42</sup> *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, I-7.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII-1.

<sup>44</sup> United States Atlantic Command, *Operation Uphold Democracy*, Joint After Action Report (Norfolk: 1995), 51.

<sup>45</sup> Megill, 14.

<sup>46</sup> Donnelly and others, 401.

<sup>47</sup> Roland I. Perusse, *Haitian Democracy Restored, 1991-1995*, (Lanham: University Press of America, Inc. 1995), 103.

<sup>48</sup> Megill, 27.

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